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We investigate the impact of the degree of competition in a Cournot market on one firm’s 
unilateral incentives to invest in R&D. Applying comparative static analyses we get different 
predictions depending on the magnitude of the innovation efficiency parameter α . Even inner 
solutions arose. For  1 → α  the comparative statics predicate that incentives to invest in R&D are 
strongest in a monopoly whereas for smaller α  the optimal market structure for unilateral 
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1. Introduction 
A bulk of evidence indicates that there is a positive effect of innovative activity on firm 
profits, productivity, economic growth and total welfare. Among others Kamien and 
Schwartz (1975) already stressed the general importance of research and development 
(R&D). On account of all the positive effects innovation has in general on an economy, it 
is important to understand which conditions promote R&D activity of the firms. Therefore 
in this paper we consider the question which degree of competition in the product market 
provides the strongest unilateral incentives for a single firm to innovate. Is it more 
worthwhile for a firm to invest in R&D if this firm faces more competition? Is the increase 
in its profits caused by a cost reducing innovation highest in a monopoly setting? Or is it 
rather more profitable to innovate under moderate competition?  
The question which market structure provides strongest incentives to invest in R&D is not 
new.
1 Schumpeter (1954) advocates that a monopoly setting guarantees a strong interest 
for a firm to invest in innovation
2. Schumpeter thinks of an economy as a process of 
“creative destruction”, meaning that in an economy products and processes are constantly 
renewed or replaced by improved ones. This implies that a monopoly position which can 
be achieved by innovation will be temporarily limited. A firm will invest in innovation 
only if it gets the chance of obtaining monopoly power by innovation at least for a time 
and it will continue investing in innovation due to the threat of losing its monopoly 
position.
3 Therefore, perfect competition which implies immediate imitation would 
destroy incentives to innovate.
4 
Arrow (1962) supports a different view. He states that “the incentive to invent is less 
under monopolistic than under competitive conditions, but even in the latter case it will be 
less than is socially desirable” (Arrow (1962), p. 619). So according to Arrow there is less 
innovative activity in a monopoly than in a competitive market.
5  
                                                 
1 Nevertheless, the discussion of this problem has not lead to generally accepted results. Cohen and Levin 
(1989, p. 1075) already stated that “[e]conomists have offered an array of theoretical arguments yielding 
ambiguous predictions about the effects of market structure on innovation.” 
2 Similarly Aghion et al (2005, p. 1) state that also IO theory “typically predicts [that] innovation should 
decline with competition while empirical work finds that it increases”. 
3 Note that Schumpeter emphasizes the impact of the threat of potential entrant and rivalry, a situation which 
is not framed in this paper. 
4 For a discussion of the Schumpeterian hypotheses see Kamien and Schwartz (1982). 
5 This is a more common view. For instance, Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980, p. 289) also emphasize that “a 
pure monopolist […] appears to have insufficient incentive […] to undertake R&D expenditure”. 
Furthermore, Geroski (1990) found strong evidence that monopoly power has a dampening effect on 
innovative activity and that competition is desirable to improve R&D incentives. In his study he used data 
on major innovations introduced in the UK during the 1970s. Nickell (1996) and Blundell et al (1995) came 
to similar results.   2
Intuitively, one might think that the incentive to innovate is strongest if there is moderate 
competition.
6 Under perfect competition the advantages that occur because of innovation 
might be directly negated and under a monopoly situation there might be no incentives to 
invest, because the firm already possesses monopoly power. However, under moderate 
competition there might be on the one hand enough competition to stimulate innovative 
activity and on the other hand the probability that an innovator gets at least some benefits 
out of his investment is also sufficient
7. We will investigate these questions in the course 
of our research. 
 
2. The model 
In a simple Cournot setting we investigate the impact of static market structure on one 
firm’s unilateral incentives to invest in R&D in the short run using comparative statics. 
First, we introduce a static Cournot setting in a one product case in which no firm invests 
in R&D. Then we explore the question under which degree of competition one deviating, 
innovating firm among these firms extracts the highest additional profit (i.e. the difference 
between profits after innovation and profits before innovation) due to its innovation. That 
is, we assume that firms take a myopic view – they maximize their own behavior given the 
decisions of the other firms.  
 
2.1 Investing in Process Innovation 
Imagine a market for one homogenous commodity in which n identical risk-neutral firms i 
decide simultaneously what quantity qi ( i = 1,…,n) of this commodity they want to 
produce and maximize their profits πi given the quantities of the other firms. Moreover, 
we assume for simplicity that every firm i faces the same constant marginal costs c (with  
c  ≤ 1/2)
8 and there are no fixed costs. The effect of potential entry is neglected. For the 
inverse demand function  Q p − =1,  i n  w h i c h  p is the price for the commodity and Q is the 
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6 There are also both theoretical as well as empirical studies which support this view. See Loury (1979), p. 
395. 
7 Among others Kamien and Schwartz (1976) show analytically that under certain circumstances an 
intermediate degree of technological rivalry increases innovative activity most. Aghion et al (2005) found 
empirical evidence for an inverted U relationship between competition and innovation. 
8 By this we exclude drastic innovation, so the market size remains constant.   3 
If firm i invests unilaterally in R&D it reduces its former marginal costs c to ci, where 
c ci α =  with  1 0 < <α .  α  is called the innovation efficiency parameter. Note that the 
smaller α  the better is the innovation. The n-1 other firms j still face costs c. If we assume 
that the fixed costs F of the innovation are the same for every firm i, we can ignore them      
(F = 0), because we are only interested in the different additional profits of an innovating 
firm i under different degrees of market concentration. After firm i invested in R&D the 
produced quantities are as follows: 
1




















 for the remaining n-1 other firms j. The equilibrium price is 
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, the profit for firm i (neglecting the cost of R&D) is 
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π .  
We define the additional profit Di of the unilateral investing firm i as the difference 
between its profit after the innovation and its profit before the innovation. Let us now 
develop firm i´s additional profit Di for every possible magnitude of α  ( 1 0 < <α ) using 
the equilibrium profits from above. We derive: 
2
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. Di depends on the number of 
firms n, the innovation efficiency parameter α and the cost level c.  
 
2.2 Comparative statics 
We analyze now under which market structure the additional profit Di is largest. To get 
the optimal number of firms n, we differentiate Di with respect to n:
9 
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Di . Equating this expression with 0 and 











. This is the number of firms in the market 
which provides the strongest incentives to innovate for firm i  (neglecting the integer 
problem).
 The optimal number 
∗ n  varies depending on the cost structure. There even exist 
                                                 
9 The optimal n is defined in the following as the number of firms in a market which provides the strongest 
incentives for a firm to innovate (i.e. the market structure under which the additional profit Di is highest for a 
firm for given c and α ). Note that it is not a deciding variable of the firm.   4
 
inner solutions at specific magnitudes of cost reduction α  and cost levels c. Figure 1 gives 








Now we investigate the influence of α  on the optimal number of firms in a market. 
Differentiating the optimal number of firms 
∗ n  with respect to α  yields: 











. This expression is always smaller than zero which signifies that the 
optimal 
∗ n  decreases as α  increases given c. So the “better” the innovation is (the smaller 
α  is) the more profitable is innovation in a more competitive environment. Consider the 
case  1 → α , which would be equivalent with a marginal cost reduction. Here it holds that 
1 →
∗ n .
10 Therefore we can predict if the cost reduction is only marginal that in a 
monopoly the incentives to invest in R&D are the strongest. 
We are also interested in the impact of the cost level c on the optimal number of firms in 
the market. Differentiating the optimal number of firms with respect to c yields: 
                                                 
10 A proof is given in Appendix 1. 
Figure 1: Example for the additional profit Di as a function of n for α  = 1/4 and c = 1/3 
The optimal n is 8/5. As there is always a discrete number of firms in the market the optimal 
number of firms in this case is 2, because if there are 2 firms in the market firm i´s additional profit 
Di is larger than in a monopoly.   5 
 












. This expression is always larger than zero. Thus, the optimal 
∗ n  
increases as c increases for a given α . As an illustration of the results consider the 
example given in Table 1.  
 
Cost 
           level  
I. e .p. α   4
1
= c  
3
1
= c  
2
1
= c  
4
1
= α   Monopoly Duopoly  4  firms 
3
1
= α   Monopoly Duopoly  3  firms 
2
1
= α   Monopoly Monopoly  Duopoly 
3
2
= α   Monopoly Monopoly  Duopoly 
4
3
= α   Monopoly Monopoly Monopoly 
Table 1: Example: Most profitable market structure for the innovating firm for specific α  and c 
I. e. p. = innovation efficiency parameter            
 
For the further discussion of our results we have to take into account what happens when 
we vary the cost level and the magnitude of cost reduction. First, regard the influence of 
the initial level of marginal cost c, holding the cost reduction and the number of firms n 
constant. The lower the cost level, the larger the produced quantity qj of the non-
innovating firms and the smaller the difference between the produced quantities qi and qj. 
Under a low cost level the additional profit Di is largest when there is no competition at 
all. The higher the cost level, the more profitable competition becomes for the investing 
firm. Intuitively, when there are already low costs, the investing firm does not improve its 
situation too much by its innovation compared to the other firms. As we have seen above, 
the difference in the produced quantities qi and qj decreases as the cost level decreases. 
However, under an initially high cost level a cost reduction leads to comparative 
advantages increasing the additional profit a lot, because the higher the cost level, the 
larger the difference between the produced quantities qi and qj.  
Second, what effect does the magnitude of the cost reduction have on the quantities? The 
stronger the cost reduction (i.e. the smaller α ), the larger the produced quantity qi of the 
investing firm i and the less the quantity qj of all the other firms j holding the other 
parameters  n and c constant. This implies that also the difference in the produced   6
quantities qi - qj increases as the magnitude of the cost reduction increases (i.e. as α  
decreases). So the comparative advantage of firm i is larger the higher the cost reduction.
11 
When the new technology leads only to a small cost reduction (e.g. α  is close to one), the 
advantages in innovating are the largest, when there are no other firms in the market or 
only few firms depending on the cost level. But as the cost reduction increases, the 
incentives for firm i to innovate are larger under competition at least at higher cost levels.  
Combining these two elements we can conclude that a firm has the strongest incentives to 
unilaterally invest in R&D, when it faces no competition, when the cost reduction due to 
its innovation is only small and the cost level is small, too. Considering that the cost level 
increases and the cost reduction is moderate, then firm i´s incentives to invest in R&D are 
strongest in a duopoly or an oligopoly with three or four firms. Moreover, when all the 
firms face high marginal costs c and the innovation of firm i leads to a great cost 
reduction, then the incentives to innovate are strongest under competition.  
 
3. Conclusion 
We scrutinized a simple Cournot framework to investigate the impact of market structure 
on innovative activity. From our comparative statics we derived an interesting result. If the 
change in the marginal costs is only marginal ( 1 → α ) the incentives to invest in 
innovation are the strongest under monopoly power, thus supporting the Schumpeterian 
hypothesis that innovation increases with market concentration. However, when α  is 
decreasing the optimal number of firms is increasing, which means that more competition 
is profitable. So our analysis points to the environmental factors which specific market 
structure stimulates innovation most. In fact, the “optimal” market structure for the 
innovating firm depends on the circumstances which cost level all the firms face before 
investing and how “good” the innovation is i.e. how much the marginal costs can be 
reduced. Therefore, incentives can be the strongest under no as well as under moderate 
competition.  
However, due to the restrictive assumptions the results need to be interpreted carefully. 
We just investigated the question of an optimal degree of competition under comparative 
statics by considering the unilateral behavior of one investing firm, having studied the 
myopic view of one innovating firm. A full equilibrium analysis is beyond the scope of 
this paper. 
                                                 



































=1. Therefore firm i’s incentive to invest in R&D is 
strongest in a monopoly situation if the cost reduction is just marginal.  
 
Appendix 2 
Derivation of the impact of c on the quantities: Differentiating firm i’s quantity 
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 with respect to c leads to 
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. According to the quantity qj we can recognize that 





q j ). However, 
concerning the quantity qi of the investing firm, we cannot give an unambiguous 
prediction, because the numerator of the quantity qi depends not only on the cost level but 






 can be smaller 
or larger than zero). For some values of n and α  the quantity qi is decreasing with an 
increasing cost level c and for some values of n and α  the quantity qi is increasing. 
0
1











n  or  
n
n 1 −
> α  respectively. 
 
The impact of c on the difference between the quantities 
1




















:  ) 1 ( α − = −
∗ ∗ c q q j i . We can see that the higher the cost level c is, the 
larger the difference is in the produced quantities between the innovating firm and every 
other firm in the market. 
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Derivation of the impact of α  on the quantities: Differentiating firm i’s quantity 
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